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FELONS, GUNS, AND THE LIMITS OF
FEDERAL POWER
DEAN A. STRANG*

INTRODUCTION

Lester Lemons was like many. His federal troubles began
literally by accident: a fender-bender in West Allis, Wisconsin.
Lemons had bullets in his pocket when frisked after the accident.
Local police then searched the car in which he had been a
passenger and found a foreign-made gun. A man at the scene said
Lemons earlier flashed the gun in his waistband. Officers arrested
Lemons for possessing the gun and the bullets.
Lemons was a convicted felon. The police jailed him in local
custody and referred him to state prosecutors. Later, federal
prosecutors decided to file federal felon-in-possession charges as
part of the "Operation Ceasefire" initiative in that district.
The ensuing federal indictment charged that Lemons merely
possessed one gun and twelve bullets. The government did not
contend that Lemons acquired the gun or the bullets in interstate
commerce, or that he engaged in any commercial activity. Typical
of other federal felon-in-possession cases, Lemons' indictment
charged that the gun and the bullets "had prior to his possession
been transported in interstate commerce, and the possession of
which was therefore in and affecting commerce." The government
never claimed to know with whom, under what circumstances,
when, or how the gun and the bullets earlier passed in interstate
commerce.
But the manufacturer made the gun outside
Wisconsin, so it necessarily crossed a state line at some time
before it reached Lemons. Ditto the bullets. The government did
not contend that Lemons even knew that the gun and bullets had
passed in interstate commerce.
* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1982; J.D., University of Virginia, 1985. Mr.
Strang was, until August 2005, the Federal Defender for the Eastern and
Western Districts of Wisconsin. He is in private practice and an Adjunct
Professor of Law at Marquette University Law School.

1. Lester Lemons' case is typical of many. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recited its details at United States v. Lemons,
302 F.3d 769, 770 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1049 (2002). The Seventh
Circuit affirmed Lemons' conviction. The author represented Lemons in the
district court and on appeal.
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Like thousands of felons in recent years before him and since,
Lester Lemons unwittingly became part of an experiment. Often
collaboratively with states and local governments, the federal
government in select districts has sought to impose longer federal
prison terms on some felons with guns than state law provides for
those crimes, thoroughly local in their commission. Two effects of
this experiment are to press federal jurisdiction to (or past) its
limits, and to trump state legislative choices about punishment
with federal choices in a small percentage of cases chosen by
federal prosecutors on largely undisclosed criteria. That second
effect raises challenging practical and philosophical questions
about federalism and invites serious inquiry into who loses this
federal lottery and why.
But this article principally focuses on the first effect. The
jurisdictional question lies in many of the felon-in-possession cases
that the federal government prosecutes in every district in the
nation. Yet, no federal appellate court ever has found a felon-inpossession case beyond the reach of the federal government.
Indeed, only rarely have federal courts taken a jurisdictional
challenge seriously.
At first blush, this is surprising. The Supreme Court's view of
the Commerce Clause has changed since the Court last briefly
considered the constitutionality of a federal law punishing felons
with guns in 1971. But the Court never has considered whether
the current statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), lies within congressional
prerogative under the Commerce Clause.
The issue is ready for a fresh and searching look. With the
exception of the very short discussion in the 1971 case, Supreme
Court decisions only have assumed the constitutionality of felonin-possession laws. At the very least, time and more recent
decisions have overtaken that assumption. Today, most felon-inpossession prosecutions in federal court appear practically to rest
on a Crossing State Lines Clause that appears nowhere in the
Constitution, rather than on the Commerce Clause that does.2
In one respect, this article does what appellants and courts
have not done. It starts at the beginning of federal efforts to keep
firearms from felons. That proves an interesting place to start.
I. INTERPRETING THE REACH OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

A. Commerce Clause History
Congress first prohibited certain felons from possessing guns
in the Federal Firearms Act of 1938.' The timing of that Act is
2. U.S. CONST., art I, § 8, cl. 3.
3. Ch. 850, No. 785, 52 Stat. 1250 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 901-909 (1940)
(repealed 1968)). As relevant here, that Act made it unlawful for "any person
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important. It came less than one year after the Supreme Court
averted President Roosevelt's "court-packing" plan by a change of
one vote on the scope of the Commerce Clause.
Until 1937, a slim majority of the Supreme Court often read
the Commerce Clause narrowly enough to strike down signature
New Deal enactments. One after another, usually on 5-4 votes,
they fell to a restrictive understanding of Congress's authority
under Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States
Constitution: first the oil regulation efforts of the National
Recovery Administration, then the Railroad Retirement Act of
1934,' the National Industrial Recovery Act,6 the Federal Farm
Bankruptcy Act,7 the Agricultural Adjustment Act,' and finally the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act.9
In February 1937, a frustrated President Roosevelt proposed
adding one Supreme Court justice for each sitting justice over the
age of 70. The Court would have swelled to 15 under that plan,
with a New Deal majority. President Roosevelt met resistance in
Congress, but he persisted. In a fireside chat on March 9, 1937, he
went directly to the public. °
Then, in the landmark case of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp.," Justice Owen J. Roberts switched sides" and the

who has been convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in
interstate or foreign commerce, and the possession of a firearm or ammunition
by any such person shall be presumptive evidence that such firearm or
ammunition was shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by
such person in violation of this chapter." 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1940)(repealed
1968).
4. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935).
5. R.R. Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 374 (1935).
6. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546
(1935).
7. Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 601-02
(1935).
8. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63-64 (1936).
9. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 302-03 (1936).
10. See Franklin Roosevelt, Fireside Chat on Reorganization of the
Judiciary,
March
9,
1937,
available
at
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/030937.html (setting forth the transcript of
President Roosevelt's plea to the public).
11. 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
12. This was the famous "switch in time that saves nine," a phrase that a
now-forgotten journalist likely coined. THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

234 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2005).

President Hoover appointed Justice Roberts, a Philadelphia lawyer, in 1930.
Id. at 860. He generally sided with the conservative "Four Horsemen" of the
Court on business regulation issues before Jones & Laughlin. Id. at 358.
More accurately, though, the decision just weeks earlier in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish,300 U.S. 379 (1937), started the Court's accession to New Deal
policies.
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National Labor Relations Act of 1935 stood by a 5-4 vote. What
had fallen by one vote now stood by one.
That decision, and Justice Van Devanter's retirement soon
after, meant that New Dealers no longer saw a political need to
change the Court by packing it. The Court had changed itself.
As subsequent Roosevelt appointees took their seats on the
Supreme Court, the Commerce Clause quickly reached its highwater mark, arguably spilling over the levees the Framers
engineered. In United States v. Darby Lumber Co.," the Court
approved the 1938 Fair Labor Standards Act's wage controls on
intrastate commerce as an "appropriate means to the attainment
of a legitimate end" because the intrastate activities "so affect[ed]"
interstate commerce. 1
The crest came with Wickard v. Filburn." That case
concerned the Second Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. It
asked whether an Ohio farmer's wheat, which never left his farm
because his family and his livestock ate it, fell within the
marketing quotas that the 1938 Act established. Roscoe Filburn's
unauthorized crop yielded just 239 bushels. By a 9-0 vote, the
Supreme Court held that the wheat quotas applied to Filburn and
lay within Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.
Consuming their own wheat, farmers like Filburn, in the
aggregate, depressed the market price of grain. That affected
interstate commerce. The Court acknowledged that the purely
local character of an activity "may help in a doubtful case to
determine whether Congress intended to reach it." 6 But, Wickard
went on to hold that, "even if appellee's activity be local and
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce and this irrespective of
whether such effect is what might
at some earlier time have been
7
defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.'"'
Filburn engaged at least generally in economic activity when
he grew his own winter wheat. He fed it to his chickens, and in
turn, sold them and their eggs. He saved some wheat for seed.
Presumably, that spared him from the line of seed buyers at the
local co-op before the growing season started, just as his family's
own consumption probably meant he left less money at the grocer's
counter. Only collectively could Filburn and his fellow wheatgrowers have produced any appreciable impact on interstate

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
Id.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Id. at 124.
Id. at 125.
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commerce, and by their absence at that. The Court admitted as
much.18
Never before had the Court viewed the Commerce Clause as
reaching quite so far. Justice Jackson suggested that the decision
9 swept more broadly still,2 0 but invoking
in Gibbons v. Ogden"
Chief Justice John Marshall and the Court's first significant
Commerce Clause decision seemed more rhetorical flourish than
serious claim.
B. Tot v. United States
There at Wickard's limits stood the Supreme Court's
rendering of the Commerce Clause when a challenge to the
Federal Firearms Act of 1938 arrived at the Court in 1943.
Significantly, Justice Roberts - the reluctant fifth vote for a more
expansive congressional role under the Commerce Clause - wrote
the decision in Tot v. United States." The statute at issue was
narrower than today's felon-in-possession law: the 1938 Act
prohibited only receipt of a firearm or ammunition that moved in
interstate or foreign commerce. It did not reach possession,
shipment, receipt, or transport of a firearm as 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)
does now. Instead, the 1938 Act provided that a prohibited
person's possession of a firearm or ammunition "shall be
presumptive evidence that such firearm or ammunition was
shipped or transported or received, as the case may be, by such
person in violation of this Act."2
The question Tot presented was whether Congress
constitutionally could create that presumption. Congress could
not.2" Tot did not address directly the Commerce Clause question.
One reason it did not lies in an important government concession:
Both courts below held that the offense created by the Act is
confined to receipt of firearms or ammunition as a part of interstate
transportation and does not extend to the receipt, in an intrastate
transaction, of such articles which, at some prior time, have been
transported interstate.
The Government agrees that this
construction is correct. 4
In other words, the government agreed in Tot that the theory
it has used against Lester Lemons and a legion of others was
impermissible under the original felon-in-possession statute. Even
18. See id. at 127-28 (noting that where many farmers practice as Filburn

does, the effect "is far from trivial").
19.
20.
21.
22.
1250,

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 120.
319 U.S. 463, 464 (1943).
Id. at 464 (quoting § 2(f) of the Federal Firearms Act, Ch. 850, 52 Stat.
1251, 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1940)(repealed 1968)).

23. Id. at 466-72.
24. Id. at 466.
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in the heyday of federal regulation under the Commerce Clause
and Wickard, the government apparently viewed this popular
current theory of prosecution - that a past crossing of state lines
establishes the interstate commerce element - as beyond the first
statute's reach.
More than sixty years after Tot, it would be hard to know
whether the government endorsed the narrower construction as a
constitutional imperative or merely as a matter of legislative
purpose.
But, the words of the 1938 statute ("receive any
firearm . . . which has been shipped" in interstate commerce)
would have borne a broader construction reaching an intrastate
receipt long after the gun crossed state lines, even if the
Commerce Clause would not have.
In sum, the government disavowed its current favorite theory
when the reasoning in Wickard held full sway, and when the
Supreme Court would have been most likely to accept that theory.
The concession meant no call to decide a Commerce Clause
question in Tot.
C. Recent Felon-In-PossessionCases
There Commerce Clause jurisprudence stood almost thirty
years later, when the Supreme Court next turned to a law
punishing felons with guns in 1971. This time, in United States v.
Bass,2" the Court confronted the Commerce Clause question. It
had to face the question, for in the years since Tot, the government
had drifted a great distance from its concession that past receipt in
interstate commerce would not do. By 1971, the government
viewed a new statute26 as banning all gun possessions by felons.
In the government's opinion, the statute required no proven
connection with interstate commerce in individual cases.27
Still, the Supreme Court's short discussion of the Commerce
Clause appeared only at the very end of its opinion in Bass, as if
an afterthought. Bass principally presented the question whether
Congress intended to require proof of a connection to interstate
commerce in possession cases. As a matter of legislative intent,
the government argued that Congress intended proof of the
interstate commerce link only under the 'receives' or 'transports'

25. 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971).
26. 18 U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1970)(repealed 1968). That provision read:
Any person who - (1) has been convicted by a court of the United
States or of a State or any political subdivision thereof of a felony, ...
and who receives, possesses, or transports in commerce or affecting
commerce, after the date of enactment of this Act, any firearm shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned for not more than two years,

or both.
Id.
27. Bass, 404 U.S. at 338.
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Bass, then, sought primarily to ascertain
parts of the statute.
legislative intent, not to discern the constitutional limits of
legislative power.
Finding that "the statute does not read well under either
view,"29 the Supreme Court favored the narrower reading after a
thorough discussion of this ambiguous provision. The phrase "in
commerce or affecting commerce" applied to all three methods of
The
committing the crime: possession, receipt, or transport."
Court appreciated that, "[a]bsent proof of some interstate
commerce nexus in each case, § 1202(a) dramatically intrudes
upon traditional state criminal jurisdiction.""'
Having reached that conclusion, the Court then added in the
last paragraph of the opinion "a final word about the nexus with
interstate commerce that must be shown in individual cases." 2 In
full, the Court wrote:
The Government can obviously meet its burden in a variety of ways.
We note only some of these. For example, a person "possesses .. .
in commerce or affecting commerce" if at the time of the offense the
gun was moving interstate or on an interstate facility, or if the
Significantly broader in reach,
possession affects commerce.
however, is the offense of "receiv[ing] . . . in commerce or affecting

commerce," for we conclude that the Government meets its burden
here if it demonstrates that the firearm has previously traveled in
interstate commerce. This is not the narrowest possible reading of
the statute, but canons of clear statement and strict construction do
"not mean that every criminal statute must be given the narrowest
possible meaning in complete disregard of the purpose of the
legislature."

United States v. Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503, 510 (1955).

We have resolved the basic uncertainty about the statute in favor of
the narrow reading, concluding that "in commerce or affecting
commerce" is part of the offense of possessing or receiving a firearm.
But, given the evils that prompted the statute and the basic
legislative purpose of restricting the firearm-related activity of
convicted felons, the readings we give to the commerce requirement,
although not all narrow, are appropriate. And consistent with our
regard for the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal
jurisdiction, our reading preserves as an element of all the offenses
a requirement suited to federal criminal jurisdiction alone."
With that one paragraph, offering but a single citation on a
general canon of statutory construction, Bass implicitly suggested
that the Commerce Clause permitted the statute's reach, upon a
showing of a link to interstate commerce. Without explanation,
28. Id. at 339, 341-42.
29. Id. at 339.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 347-50.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 350-51 (internal citations omitted).
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the Court construed one verb, "receives," as allowing a looser link
to interstate commerce than another verb in the same statute,
"possesses." It never addressed the third verb, "transports." Bass
hardly bespoke searching consideration of the Commerce Clause.
The Supreme Court's next two, and most recent, encounters
with felon-in-possession statutes never addressed the Commerce
Clause or the statutes' constitutionality at all. Both Barrett v.
United States34 and Scarborough v. United States35 limited their
consideration to statutory construction and legislative intent.
The earlier case, Barrett, was the first to consider the Gun
Control Act of 1968,3" which amended the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 37 Barrett decided, in a case
apparently charging receipt of a gun, that the statute applied to
the defendant's intrastate purchase of a gun that previously
moved in interstate commerce, apart from the defendant's
receipt.38 Noting that Barrett conceded Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause "to regulate interstate trafficking in
firearms,"39 the majority treated the case as resting entirely on
legislative intent. Barrett examined the terms and structure of the
statute closely, as well as its legislative history, and drew a
But the
reasonable conclusion about congressional intent."
decision never considered whether that intent was within
34. 423 U.S. 212 (1976).
35. 431 U.S. 563 (1977).
36. Gun Control Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
37. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 197 § 972 (1968). Bass and Scarborough v. United States, 431
U.S. 563 (1977) (the case after Barrett), both concerned 18 U.S.C. app.
§ 1202(a), which the Firearm Owners' Protection Act of 1968 repealed. The two
statutes are different and the differences may be material. See United States
v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 977 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss, J., dissenting)(stating
that the changes in the laws reveal a different statutory intent for each).
Further, Title IV of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968,
unlike the present version, treated shipping and transporting under one
subsection, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1964 & Supp. V. 1970), and receiving under
another. § 922(h) (1964 & Supp. V. 1970). The 1970 versions provided:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person - (1) who is under indictment
for, or who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; .... to ship or transport
any firearm or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce. (h) It
shall be unlawful for any person - (1) who is under indictment for, or
who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by
to receive any firearm
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ....
or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce.
Id. at §922 (g)-(h).
38. Barrett, 423 U.S. at 213.
39. Id. at 215.
40. See id. at 216-25 (holding that it would be inconsistent to construe the
statute as applying "[T]o the receipt of the firearm as part of an interstate
movement").

20061

Felons, Guns, and the Limits of FederalPower

Congress's constitutional power under the Commerce Clause.
Along the way, the Barrett Court dismissed the government's
concession in Tot. That was "merely a recital as to what the
District Court and the Court of Appeals in that case had held and
a further statement that the Government had agreed that the
The majority
construction by the lower courts was correct."4
admitted that the government's stance in Tot did not help it in
Barrett. Still, there is "no rule of law to the effect that the
Government must be consistent in its stance in litigation over the
years," the majority apologized.4"
Only two justices dissented in Barrett. Yet that dissent
proved important more than a quarter century later, if only
because then-Justice Rehnquist joined it. Justice Stewart wrote
the dissent. 3 He argued that Tot adopted the government's
concession, rather than just noted it, and that the 1968 law, in
turn, retained what he saw as Tot's requirement that a defendant
actually receive the gun in the course of an interstate shipment.4
While a felon's possession of a loaded revolver was "offensive to
those who believe in law and order,"45 Justices Stewart and
Rehnquist concluded that the defendant committed no federal
crime where, "[tihe prosecution submitted no evidence of any kind
that the petitioner had participated in any interstate activity
involving the revolver, either before or after its purchase." 6 Chief
Justice Rehnquist's views evidently never changed in the
intervening years - judging by United States v. Lopez, Jones v.
United States, and United States v. Morrison4" (or his dissenting
vote in Gonzales v. Raich') - so until his death, there was at least
one potential vote for limiting the reach of § 922(g) to true
interstate commercial activity.

41. Id. at 221-22.
42. Id. at 222 n.6.
43. Id. at 228-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 229 n.3, 230-31.
45. Id. at 228.
46. Id.
47. United States v. Morrison, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (stating that the
Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 does not regulate commercial activity or
relate to interstate commerce); See United States v. Lopez, 529 U.S. 848, 85051 (2000)(stating that an owner-occupied residence not used for any
commercial purpose will not be regulated under the text of the commerce
clause); See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000)(stating that gender-motivated
violence does not translate into economic activity).
48. 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2221 (2005).(O'Connor J., dissenting) Although Chief
Justice Rehnquist did not write in Raich, he joined most of Justice O'Connor's
dissent, which viewed "the case before us [as] materially indistinguishable
from Lopez and Morrison when the same considerations are taken into
account." Id. at 2222 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).

.394
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The year after Barrett, the Supreme Court decided
Scarborough. That case seems the foundation of the government's
modern theory: a felon's mere possession of a gun that previously
traveled in interstate commerce means guilt.
Because
Scarborough again addressed only a question of statutory
construction, the case pours no explicit constitutional foundation.
As the Court framed it, the issue in Scarborough was
"whether proof that the possessed firearm previously traveled in
interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the statutorily required
nexus between the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and
commerce." 9 The Court then considered both the "text of the
0
statute""
and the "legislative history in its entirety,"5 concluding
that Congress intended no more "than the minimal nexus that the
firearm have been, at some time, in interstate commerce."6 '
Scarborough nowhere addressed what nexus the Constitution
might set as the minimum. It came no closer to the Commerce
Clause than acknowledging that the legislative history revealed
"some concern about the constitutionality of such a statute
[proscribing mere possession]."'
That ambivalence, the
Scarborough Court explained, is what "made us unwilling in Bass
to find the clear intent necessary to conclude that Congress meant
to dispense with a nexus requirement entirely."54
So Scarborough betrayed a tacit assumption that perhaps
Congress could have omitted any requirement that the
government prove a nexus to interstate commerce when felons
possess guns. That notable, if unstated, assumption may account
for the Court's treatment of the statute's scope as no more than a
matter of legislative intent.
A footnote also reveals this inattention to possible
constitutional limits on federal legislative reach into local conduct
and policing. Scarborough there retracted the suggestion in Bass
that possession might require a stricter nexus with interstate
commerce than does receipt.'
While such a requirement
continued to make sense, the Court mused in the footnote, "further
consideration" persuaded the Court that Congress meant no such
difference. "Congress was not particularly concerned with the
impact on commerce except as a means to insure the
constitutionality" of the statute, the note closed.
49. Scarborough, 431 U.S. at 564.
50. Id. at 569-71.
51. Id. at 572.
52. Id. at 575; see also id. at 577 (stating that Congress intended a broad
construction to allow any intersection with interstate commerce to be
sufficient).
53. Id. at 575.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 575 n.11.
56. Id.
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The Court left the Commerce Clause unexamined in
Scarborough, then, and that decision scraped no deeper than the
meaning of the statute. Showing a "minimal nexus" to interstate
commerce sufficed, the Court held, because Congress intended no
more. Scarborough neither decided nor even considered in passing
what standard the Commerce Clause might set for "minimal."
57
Although
Justice Stewart dissented again in Scarborough.
he
did
not join the
Justice Rehnquist did not join that dissent,
majority, either. He took no part in the case.
In any event, neither Barrett nor Scarborough fairly
suggested that the current felon-in-possession statute comports
with the Commerce Clause. Those decisions implicitly assumed
constitutionality but never addressed the question, let alone
decided it.
In the Supreme Court, all considered, the constitutional
footing of a felon-in-possession statute like 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)'
is as precarious as the single concluding paragraph in Bass.
Indeed, the footing is that paragraph. Thirty-five years have
passed since; more time than between the Tot and Bass decisions.
II.

LoPEz, MORRISON, AND RAICH

A. Lopez
More than a decade ago, the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lopez59 ignited a flashfire of academic and judicial
comment and, a step back from the heat, drew thousands of
prisoners and criminal defendants hoping to light an array of
likely and unlikely personal candles by the same spark. Almost all
of these prisoners the courts turned back to the dark. Now
familiar, Lopez concerned the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990.

57. This time, the dissent was as narrow as the Court's opinion. Justice
Stewart also looked no further than the statute's meaning. Justice Stewart
preferred a narrower construction under the rules of lenity because he was
troubled by a statute that would make a person who already owned guns
guilty of a second felony - possession of the guns - immediately upon his
conviction for some first felony, and thought Congress's intentions ambiguous.
Scarborough,431 U.S. at 578-80 (Stewart, J., dissenting). He argued that the
statute should apply only to persons who first come into possession of a
firearm after a felony conviction. Id. at 578.
58. This is the current felon-in-possession provision. It reads:
(g) It shall be unlawful for any person - (1) who has been convicted in
any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding
one year; . . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or
possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to
receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or
transported in interstate or foreign commerce.
18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(2000).
59. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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That statute made a federal offense of possessing a firearm in a
place the person knew, or should have known, was within a 1000foot "school zone.""°
It required no connection to interstate
commerce. 6
Lopez struck down that provision as exceeding Congress's
authority to regulate interstate commerce:
Section 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with "commerce" or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms. Section 922(q) is not an
essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which
the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate
activity were regulated. It cannot, therefore, be sustained under our
cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are
connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the
aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce. 2
Narrowly understood, the 5-4 decision invalidated but one
statutory subsection. Most of Lopez discussed first principles,
though. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. He
noted initially that, "[t]he Constitution creates a Federal
Government of enumerated powers. " '
Further, the Supreme
Court acknowledged long ago "that limitations on the commerce
power are inherent in the very language of the Commerce
Clause."
The Lopez majority observed specifically that the Constitution
"withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would
authorize enactment of every type of legislation." 5
Instead,
"[u]nder our federal system, the 'States possess primary authority
for defining and enforcing the criminal law."'
"When Congress
criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States,"
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued, "it effects a 'change in the
sensitive
relation between
federal
and state
criminal
6 7
jurisdiction.'
Analyzing the scope of the Commerce Clause, the Court
reviewed the history of that clause from the beginning.'
The
majority appreciated that cases like Wickard were expansive.
Lopez explained:

60. At the time, the statute was 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A).
61. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
62. In 1996, Congress re-enacted that prohibition in § 922(q)(2)(A). Lopez,
514 U.S. at 561.
63. Id. at 552.
64. Id. at 553 (citing Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824)).
65. Id. at 566.
66. Id. at 561 n.3 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 635
(1993)).
67. Id. (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12 (1973)).
68. Id. at 552-58.
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But even these modem-era precedents which have expanded
congressional power under the Commerce Clause confirm that this
power is subject to outer limits. In Jones & Laughlin Steel, the
Court warned that the scope of the interstate commerce power
"must be considered in the light of our dual system of government
and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of
our complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national and what is local and create completely
centralized government." Since that time, the Court has heeded
that warning and undertaken to decide whether a rational basis
existed for concluding that a regulated activity sufficiently affected
interstate commerce. 69
From that history, the Court distilled "three broad categories
of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce
power."7 0 First, "Congress may regulate the use of the channels of
interstate commerce." Second, Congress may "regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities." 7' Third, Congress has authority to
regulate activities "having a substantial relation to interstate

commerce," or, in other words, "those activities that substantially
affect interstate commerce."
Considering § 922(q), the Court quickly discarded the first
two categories, for a law banning mere possession of a gun in a
school zone clearly fell outside both of them. Section 922(q) could
stand only if it was within the third category, "regulation of an
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. "
Lopez then applied two qualifications to that third category.
First, conduct within that realm implicitly must be "economic
activity."74 The majority noted that even Wickard v. Filburn,
"which is perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce
Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic
activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone does
not.'
Second, the Court thought it relevant to ask whether a
statute examined under the third category contains a
jurisdictional element "which would ensure, through case-by-case
inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce.7 6 Section 92 2(q) required no such proof of interstate
69. Id. at 556-57 (internal citations omitted).
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 558.
Id.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id. at 559-60.
Id. at 560.
Id. at 561.
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commerce. "Unlike the statute in Bass," the Court commented,
"§ 922(q) has no express jurisdictional element which might limit
its reach to a discrete set of firearm possessions that additionally
have an 7explicit
connection with or effect on interstate
7
commerce."
Lacking both relation to economic activity and a jurisdictional
element, § 922(q) fell outside the third category. It was not a
regulation of "activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce."
The Court conceded that determining whether
intrastate activity is commercial or non-commercial may result
occasionally in legal uncertainty.8 It was willing to accept this.
Uncertainty about the outer edge of Congress's authority under
the Commerce Clause comes with the fact that there is an outer
edge, and one that is judicially enforceable.7 ' A practical boundary
problem does not mean abandoning altogether the idea of a
constitutional limit.
"To uphold the Government's contentions here," the Court
concluded, "we would have to pile inference upon inference in a
manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."" Rather than do that, the Court recalled
that the Constitution's enumeration of powers presupposes some
powers not enumerated (and thus not given to Congress), and a
remaining "distinction between what is truly national and what is
truly local."81
Perhaps because the Supreme Court split 5-4 in Lopez, most
federal appellate judges have treated that decision as a
"constitutional freak," to repeat Judge Samuel A. Alito's colorful
term."
But, a few judges and commentators, including Judge
Edward R. Becker of the Third Circuit, saw Lopez instead as a "sea
change. " '
Which of those starkly contrasting and caricatured
77. Id. at 562.
78. Id. at 566.
79. Id.

80. Id. at 567.
81. Id. at 567-68.
82. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J.,

dissenting).

Judge Alito would have struck down the federal law banning

transfer or possession of a machine gun, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). In a case
involving a home-made machine gun, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit,

with Judge Alex Kozinski writing for the majority, later did exactly that.
United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003) (2-1 decision). The
Ninth Circuit denied the government's request for en banc rehearing.
However, on the government's petition for a writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court summarily granted the writ, vacated the Ninth Circuit's judgment and
remanded for reconsideration in light of Raich. United States v. Stewart, 125

S. Ct. 2899 (2005). The case remains pending in the Ninth Circuit.
83. United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 591 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part). See Randy E. Barnett, The Original
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descriptions comes closest to historical truth remains an open
question.
Neither is exactly right or even close enough to boast. All but
committed
scholars missed most of the richness and
unpredictability of Commerce Clause jurisprudence for almost two
centuries before Lopez; collectively, those cases at least add
missing nuance to the "sea change" claim. For their part, the
cases that have followed refute the "constitutional freak" claim.
B. Morrison
More than ten years have passed since Lopez. The Supreme
Court's Commerce Clause and Tenth Amendment decisions in
those years still suggest not a sea change, but a meaningful
revival of attention to limits on congressional power. The Lopez
majority remains just one vote, but it likely remains - with some
further complexity or qualification, perhaps, after Raich and the
death of Chief Justice Rehnquist.
When the Court avoids
potential Commerce Clause infirmities by construing a statute
narrowly, the idea of limiting congressional control of local conduct
even picks up votes.
Six years ago, and just five years after Lopez reasserted the
Commerce Clause's limits, the Court struck down part of a second
federal statute as exceeding the scope of the Commerce Clause.
The decision in United States v. Morrison' held a particular civil
remedy under the Violence Against Women Act85 unconstitutional.

Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101, 103-04 (2001) ("Now
that in United States v. Morrison the Court has found another statute to be
unconstitutional because it exceeded Congress's power under the Commerce
Clause, it appears that the Court is serious about finding some limit on the
power to regulate commerce among the states."); Richard A. Epstein,
Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167
(1996)("United States v. Lopez may turn out to be a flash in the pan or it may
usher in a new age of constitutional restraint. Either way, it stands as the
most important Commerce Clause decision since the Civil Rights cases of
thirty years ago."). See Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulationof the Commerce
Clause, 74 TEX. L. REV. 695 (1996) (arguing that the Commerce Clause must
have a more permanent construction consistent with the intent of the Framers
and that the decision in Lopez is a positive step in that direction). Further, at
least one hybrid, judge as commentator, also welcomed Lopez as an
historically important decision. See David B. Sentelle, Lopez Speaks, Is
Anyone Listening?, 45 LOY. L. REV. 541, 548 (1999)(stating that for the first
time since the New Deal, the Court resurrected the Tenth Amendment).
Judge Sentelle, of the District of Columbia Circuit, regrets that, "Much of the
academy, and unfortunately of the bench, seem stuck in the past. They seem
to believe that if they ignore this specter of change, it will go away." Id.
84. 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000).
85. Pub. L. 103-322, Title IV, 108 Stat. 1796, 1902-55 (September 13, 1994).
The specific provision at issue, § 40302 of the Act, 108 Stat. 1941-42, was
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 13981.
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At the outset, Chief Justice Rehnquist, again writing for a
five-member majority, asserted that the question was "controlled
by" Lopez and two 19th-century decisions.'
That dry and
unremarkable phrase in fact gave Lopez remarkable breadth, for
superficially a statute allowing civil money damages to victims of
gender-motivated violence shared few similarities with a criminal
statute punishing possession of a gun in a school zone. Certainly
the felon-in-possession statute is closer in kind to Lopez's statute
than was the relevant section of the Violence Against Women Act.
Moreover, claiming dominion for two century-old decisions without
a jot on the New Deal shift that produced Wickard was a
deceptively important pen stroke.
Morrison acknowledged that due respect for Congress permits
the Supreme Court to invalidate a congressional enactment only
upon a plain showing that Congress exceeded constitutional
bounds.87 But there Congress did.
Reviewing Lopez, the Court reiterated "that the noneconomic,
criminal nature of the conduct at issue [in Lopez] was central to
our decision in that case."' "Lopez's review of Commerce Clause
case law demonstrates that in those cases where we have
sustained federal regulation of intrastate activity based upon the
activity's substantial effects on interstate commerce," the Court
wrote, "the activity in question has been some sort of economic
endeavor."89 Again echoing Lopez, the Morrison majority also
affirmed the importance of a jurisdictional element that might
limit a statute's reach "to a discrete set of firearm possessions that
additionally9 have an explicit connection with or effect on interstate
commerce." °
Turning to violent crime as an object of congressional
regulation, the majority noted that "thus far in our Nation's
history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in
nature."9
Accordingly, the Court rejected the argument "that
Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct
based solely on that conduct's aggregate effect on interstate
commerce. The Constitution requires a distinction between what
is truly national and what is truly local."9" "Indeed," the majority
wrote emphatically, "we can think of no better example of the

86. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 602. The two 19th Century decisions are: United
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), and the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
87. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607.
88. Id. at 610.
89. Id. at 611.
90. Id. at 611-12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
91. Id. at 613.
92. Id. at 617-18.
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police power, which the Founders denied the National Government
and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent crime
and vindication of its victims."93
If violent, but local and non-economic, crimes provide no
occasion for congressional intervention, as Morrison held, it is
difficult to insist that non-violent, local, and non-economic crimes,
like passive possession of a gun, can invite congressional
regulation. Morrison appears to leave little or no room for that,
unless perhaps a jurisdictional element limits the statute's reach
to a discrete set of firearm possessions affecting interstate
commerce. 94
But the jurisdictional element would not make
activity economic. That element itself is slippery, if the term
"commerce" is every bit as important as the term "interstate."
Morrison's import is that it is.
Even positing an atypical
"interstate" rape,95 when would such a rape also be "commercial"?'
The jurisdictional element seems in the end an odd, and not
very helpful, practical marker. It does not signal clearly what
Congress can do. However, it may be a helpful rhetorical marker
in another place: it may serve to deflect a charge that the Court
changed constitutional course radically. It lends an appearance of

93. Id. at 618.
94. Id. at 611-12 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562).
95. Congress has addressed something very close, interstate domestic
violence. See 18 U.S.C. § 2261 (a)(1)(2000)(providing that "[a] person who
travels in interstate [commerce] with the intent to kill, injure, harass, or
intimidate... and who, in the course of or as a result of such travel, commits
or attempts to commit a crime of violence against that spouse or intimate
partner, shall be punished . ..

.").

Without much imagination, that statute

could encompass a rape committed by someone who traveled in interstate
commerce with that purpose, if the rape injured or intimidated the victim in
the course of or as a result of the travel.
96. A possible answer is that rape might be both interstate and commercial,
in some sense, if it fell within the scope of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421
(2000). That act concerns prostitution primarily, but obviously the line of
consent between prostitution and rape can be blurry. In any event, the
Supreme Court struggled for three decades with the reach that the Commerce
Clause allowed Congress in fashioning that statute. See, e.g., Caminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (holding that the transportation of women
in interstate commerce to engage in the act of "debauchery" fell within the
provisions of the Act was constitutional since Congress had authority to keep
interstate commerce free from immoral acts). See Mortensen v. United States,
322 U.S. 369 (1944) (holding that husband and wife who operated a
prostitution establishment and took two prostitutes on an out-of-state trip, did
not violate the Mann Act since there was no evidence that the defendants
transported the prostitutes for the purpose of debauchery); United States v.
Beach, 324 U.S. 193 (1945) (holding that the Mann Act applies not only to
transportation in and out of the District of Columbia, but also to
transportation that takes place in the District of Columbia); Cleveland v.
United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (holding that the Mann Act applies to
transportation of wives by polygamists). Taken together, the Mann Act cases
at best have a strange harmony.
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modest adjustment and the promise of continuity that may
correspond to the Lopez/Morrison majority's intentions on
outcome, and surely corresponded to its intentions on
appearances.
Whether one agrees substantively with Judge Becker that
these cases worked a "sea change" or not, likely the Supreme
Court majority would shrink from that description as caretakers of
the Court's institutional stability and appearances.
Even
flattering caricatures threaten the self-image of those caricatured.
The rhetorical proviso for a jurisdictional element serves as a
defense even to a friendly "sea change" claim.
Whatever its cosmetic and rhetorical value, the jurisdictional
element in § 922(g)(1) today does not provide a real limitation, as
the lower federal courts understand it. In most states essentially
every felon possessing a gun falls within the statute under the
government's view, for all commercially-manufactured guns cross
at least one state line to get to non-manufacturing states.97 For
that matter, a gun manufactured in, say, New Hampshire might
travel out of state and back again in the many years that it
remains serviceable.
The jurisdictional element does almost
nothing to limit the set of firearm possessions that the statute
punishes.98
97. Many states produce few guns, and major manufacturers of different
firearm types appear loosely clustered in other states. For example, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Florida, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire
produced almost sixty-nine percent of all pistols and revolvers made in
America in 2001 (649,482 of 943,213). ANNUAL FIREARMS MANUFACTURING

AND EXPORT REPORT, (2001),available at http://www.atf.gov/firearms/
stats/afmer/afmer2001.pdf. On the other hand, New York alone (which
produces few handguns) produced more than twenty-eight percent of all rifles
and shotguns made in America in 2001 (553,528 of 1,964,367). Id.
98. Consider some numbers from a recent year. Although there surely is no
tally of how many guns pass innocently across state lines every year, the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms does tabulate the number of
firearms imported to the United States every year. Those firearms fall within
the scope of the Commerce Clause, which encompasses both foreign and
interstate commerce. In 2000 alone, a total of 1,096,782 firearms were
imported.

BATF, FIREARMS COMMERCE IN THE UNITED STATES 2001/2002,

Exhibit 3 at E-3. In 1993, according to the same exhibit, the United States
imported more than 3,000,000 firearms. The ATF writes that "imports over
the past ten years have averaged one million per year." Id. at 3.
The ATF also tracks the source of "crime guns," that is, firearms used in a
crime that law enforcement agencies later recover. In 2000, 41.7% (25,279 of
60,643) of crime guns with known originating locations were not first sold in
the state in which the firearms were recovered. BATF, CRIME GUN TRACE
REPORTS IN 2000, at 41-42 & Table 16 (July, 2002), available at
http: / / www.atfgov /firearms /ycgii /2000 /index. htm. Of course, no one knows
how many felons passively possess guns every year without using those guns
in a crime. How many crime guns are not recovered also remains unknown.
Likewise, researchers cannot know how many firearms leave the state of their
manufacture or initial sale, but later return to that state before someone uses
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Further, as the government now reads the statute, the
jurisdictional element does not assure that gun possessions have
the necessary connection with or effect on commerce.
The
government and federal courts say today that a long-past trip
across a state line, for reasons not provably commercial and
probably unknown altogether, suffices to meet this statute's
jurisdictional element. Yet the Supreme Court twice has written
that the "firearm possessions" themselves must have an explicit
connection with or effect on interstate commerce.99 The federal
courts of appeal apparently grasp no limiting effect in that
jurisdictional element, so it is little wonder that no one else does.
C. Raich
The history in the preceding ten-plus years makes Gonzales v.
Raich"'° even more challenging. Whatever else it did, Raich
clouded, rather than clarified, the reach of Lopez and Morrison.
Confronting California's medical-use allowance for intrastate
manufacture or possession of marijuana, Raich held that the
federal Controlled Substances Act brooked no such exception to its
blanket ban on marijuana and, more importantly here, that
Congress permissibly could punish the local activity California
sought to shield. 1
Students of the three cases might do well to start where they
end, and in so doing, end where they start: Lopez and Morrison
survive Raich. Taken on its own terms, Raich did not displace the
earlier cases. Rather, it distinguished them. Raich claimed
consistency with, even fealty to, Lopez and Morrison. The fact that
Justice Kennedy, in the Congress-limiting majority in both Lopez
and Morrison, joined the Congress-empowering majority in Raich,
offers at least some corroboration of the Raich majority's sincerity
(if not necessarily its logical consistency). Justice Scalia, too, who
voted to strike down federal action in Lopez and Morrison,
concurred in the Raich majority's judgment that the federal
government acted permissibly there. He likewise confessed no
second thoughts about the earlier cases.
Below this superficial starting (and ending) plane, difficulty
lurks. If Lopez, Morrison, and Raich now are a trilogy, they are
anything but triune. Just as Raich employed Lopez's three
categories of congressional competence under the Commerce
them in a crime. Clearly, though, just the number of recovered crime guns
that crossed a state line at some point would far outstrip the capacity of
federal prosecutors and federal courts to handle the potential scope of federal
jurisdiction under the current construction of the Commerce Clause.
99. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611-12 (emphasis added)(quoting Lopez, 514 U.S.
at 562).
100. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005).
101. Id. at 2204-15.
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Clause.. and otherwise suggested allegiance to Lopez,"°3 it also
endorsed the reasoning and reach of Wickard v. Filburn. Indeed,
the Raich majority apparently viewed Wickard v. Filburn as
controlling the case on all fours." While intellectually Lopez and
Wickard v. Filburn can be squared - and Lopez certainly did not
renounce the earlier case - practically and attitudinally it is hard
to square the broadest Commerce Clause case (Wickard v. Filburn)
with the first case that sought to re-establish functional limits on
the clause (Lopez). In other words, the Lopez majority conceived
one corral that ostensibly pens both horses, but did not make it
easier to ride the two at once. Little wonder that three justices
who endorsed the majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison,
including the author of both, dissented from Raich's holding that
purported to honor both Lopez and Wickard v. Filburn at once.100
More than that, the three dissenters understood Raich as
reducing Lopez to "nothing more than a drafting guide" ° for
Congress, not as honoring the earlier case. Justice O'Connor
argued that,
M

[tioday's decision suggests that the federal regulation of local
activity is immune to Commerce Clause challenge because Congress
chose to act with an ambitious, all-encompassing statute, rather
than piecemeal. In my view, allowing Congress to set the terms of
the constitutional debate in this way, i.e., by packaging regulation of
local activity in broader schemes, is tantamount to removing
meaningful limits on the Commerce Clause."7
In doing so, the principal dissent contended, the majority adopted
a definition of'economic' so capacious that it threatened "to sweep
all of productive human activity into federal regulatory reach." 10 8
The critique has force. But most of its force lies not in
attacking the definition of 'economic,' or even in mapping how
Congress might evade the limits of the Commerce Clause. Rather,
most of its force lies in Justice O'Connor's observation that the
Raich majority missed (or masked) the point: the "real problem" is
"drawing a meaningful line between 'what is national and what is
local." 1°9

102. Id. at 2205.

103. See e.g., id. at 2205, 2209-10, 2211 (referencing Lopez as a controlling
case).
104. See id. at 2205-09, 2215 ("The similarities between this case and
Wickard are striking.").
105. Justices O'Connor and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, all
dissented in Raich. Id. at 2220.
106. Id. at 2223 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
107. Id. at 2222 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 2224 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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Two points follow. First, that the "real problem" is not
legislative; it is judicial. The Supreme Court, as the line-drawer,
bears responsibility for giving its lines meaning, in the sense of
providing discernible animating principles that allow Congress,
courts, and the public at large both to understand and respect
(even if not like or agree with) the line's placement and to predict
confidently where the line next will extend. The Court has not
done that in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence in the last ten
years, or ever. Lopez only was a good first step.
Second, Justice O'Connor's dissent added little to a solution.
She ceded her best argument by assuming, for the sake of
discussion, that intrastate marijuana cultivation and possession
for personal use was economic.11 ° Parenthetically, her concession
for argument's sake if nothing else raised an interesting future
question. With Justice O'Connor choosing not to defend the
economic requirement of Lopez and Morrison, with Justice Scalia
possibly now willing to abandon that requirement,"' and with the
110. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
111. Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment may signal a strange
journey. He of course joined the majority opinions in Lopez and Morrison,
which lay heavy emphasis on the condition that intrastate activity be
economic to be eligible for federal regulation within the third category of
permissible legislation under the Commerce Clause.
Now, his Raich
concurrence argued that when viewed from the perspective of the Necessary
and Proper Clause, "[Clongress's authority to enact laws necessary and proper
for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed
against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce." Id. at 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). To Justice
Scalia, this meant that, "[wihere necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective, Congress may regulate even those intrastate activities
that do not themselves substantially affect interstate commerce." Id. at 2216.
He untethered Congress's powers as amplified by the Necessary and Proper
Clause from its powers solely under the Commerce Clause. See id. at 2218
(noting that the nature of the Necessary and Proper Clause allows Congress to
make laws that it could not make acting only under one of its enumerated
powers). Implicitly, because in Justice Scalia's view the Lopez/Morrison third
category evidently is not in play at all for purposes of the Necessary and
Proper Clause, there would be no limitation to economic activity.
The real intrigue in Justice Scalia's concurrence, then, comes with his
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause. That merits serious
scholarly consideration elsewhere. For present purposes, it suffices to say that
his expansive understanding of the Necessary and Proper Clause as
something that adds substantively to the scope of other powers when exercised
"in conjunction" with them was surprising - and surprisingly free of cited
authority. Id. at 2218.
Justice Scalia relied almost exclusively on McCulloch v. Maryland for his
interpretation. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). That case, involving the
establishment of a national bank, more comfortably fits with an ancillary,
rather than an expansive, understanding of the Commerce Clause. That is,
under a limited ancillary view conforming to the structure of a federal
government with enumerated powers only, Congress might take as necessary
and proper only those ancillary measures necessary to execute some
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four Lopez/Morrison dissenters never having accepted the
economic requirement in the first place, what will shifting blocs of
the Court do next with that cornerstone of Lopez and Morrison?
At present, though, Justice O'Connor's concession left her to
fight it out over substantial effects - a mushy, even contentless,
term1 ' that carried with it vulnerabilities to the consumable
nature of marijuana (and thus the regular need to replace it), the
potential expansion of any personal use exception to all personal
uses (why not? Why would medical use be significant to the
Constitution?), 3 and even the obvious possibility that other states
would adopt similar or broader personal use exceptions and so
increase an indirect impact on the interstate market for

marijuana."'
The dissent could have made progress in articulating
principles by which to distinguish local from national - or, more
precisely, to distinguish local and even national (in the sense of
regulation within its substantive powers. For example, if Congress wishes a
new Commission to regulate some aspect of interstate commerce, in executing
that wish it might be necessary and proper also to fix terms and numbers of
commissioners, enable the president to appoint or remove them, provide a
budget and a staff, and arrange for suitable quarters. Another example is
McCulloch's, the incorporation of a national bank as "incidental or implied" Id.
at 406, to the "great powers" to lay and collect taxes, borrow money, regulate
commerce and so forth. Id. at 406-9. Rhetorically sweeping though his
language was in McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall did not underwrite Justice
Scalia's expansively substantive view of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Conceivably, Justice Scalia might have found more support for his vision of
the Necessary and Proper Clause in the Legal Tender Case, Julliard v.
Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 440-47 (1884)(listing some implied powers of
Congress emanating from the enumerated rights). But he cited neither that
decision nor anything else on the point. Justice Scalia probably is no fan of
penumbral rights, notwithstanding the Ninth Amendment's express assertion
that unenumerated rights remain. See Burnham v. Main County Superior
Court, 495 U.S. 604, 627 n.5 (1990) (writing for the majority, Justice Scalia
noted, "[tihe notion that the Constitution, through some penumbra emanating
from the Privileges and Immunities Clause and the Commerce Clause,
establishes this Court as a Platonic check upon the society's greedy adherence
to its traditions can only be described as imperious"); see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 594-95 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the
Court in Griswold v. Connecticut based its "right to privacy" on the
"penumbras of constitutional provisions" in addition to the Due Process
Clause). Yet it would be fair, even if provocative, to suggest that Justice
Scalia's concurrence in Raich invites recognition of penumbral powers,
express
assertion that
the Tenth Amendment's
notwithstanding
unenumerated powers do not remain with the federal government. Again,
though, that is for another day.
112. See discussion supra of the fifth point in Part V.A. (discussing the
meaning of the terms "minimal" and "substantial").
113. The majority called her on that weakness in the dissent's argument.
Raich, 125 S.Ct. at 2212.
114. Id. at 2214-15 (noting that at least nine states now allow medical use of
marijuana, which Justice O'Connor's dissent "conveniently disregards").
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had it instead
recurrent in many locales) from federal contended seriously with the question of commerce." 5 All nine
justices agreed, or conceded implicitly, that the medical marijuana
users were not engaged in commerce, let alone interstate
commerce - not by any definition. That would have provided a
starting point for the dissenters. As its proponents saw it in the
1780's, the general purpose of the Commerce Clause was to give
Congress control over trade and commerce among the states and
with foreign nations, so that a national economy might develop
and be regulated nationally rather than thwarted, burdened, or
complicated by state-to-state interventions, especially by importreceiving and export-sending states to the detriment of those
without ports."1 6 But to posit a national economy or to envision one
as an achievement of an agglomerated people more powerful in
their unity was not to deny that local economies, local commerce,
and local non-commercial behavior all would continue to exist and
to lie below congressional reach.
Moreover, to assign Congress the power to regulate the
commercial interconnections among the states and their people
was not to give Congress the power to regulate the cultural
interconnections (in the sense of shared values, interests, and
The former topic invokes a specific
personal behavior).
enumerated power and should be understood at a high level of
specificity because of its assignment to the one sovereign in our
federalist system with limited, specific powers that were vetted
extensively in their design and adoption. The latter topic concerns
general police powers, reserved by default to the states and the
people, and correspondingly warrants understanding at a high
level of generality.
It was the latter topic at issue in Raich. If a Coloradoan sells
marijuana to a Californian, even to a sick Californian who might
benefit from its consumption and has her doctor's blessing, no one
disputes Congress' power to regulate (even prohibit) that
commercial transaction. But if a Coloradoan uses homegrown
marijuana just as a Californian does, and for that matter if one
thousand other Coloradoans and Californians do the same, they
115. Although most of Justice Thomas's separate dissent addressed the
Necessary and Proper Clause, he correctly understood that the scope of the
Commerce Clause must turn on the meaning of commerce, not even on the
meaning of the related but broader concept of economic. Id. at 2230, 2235-36
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Note, too, that Justice Thomas relied on McCulloch
in understanding the Necessary and Proper Clause just as did Justice Scalia
- but drew opposing conclusions. See id. at 2230-34 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(finding that the CSA was not a valid exercise of Congressional power).
116. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE CONTINENTALIST No. V., (1782) IN
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 55-60 (Morton
J. Frischel. ed., 1985)(discussing the power of Congress); THE FEDERALIST No.
42,(James Madison) (January 22, 1788)(discussing the Executive power).
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demonstrate only a cultural interconnectedness, not commercial
behavior. Congress has no power to regulate this. Behavior that is
widely recurrent may make it national in the sense of being
observable from coast to coast. But it does not make the behavior
commercial, and therefore in this context does not make it federal.
A focus on commerce and on defending the need for a high
level of specificity in that context (or, put another way, a low level
of generality), would have led the Raich minority to a more
confident answer to the majority's warning that there would prove
no logical distinction in federal power between allowing medical
use and allowing recreational use. The answer would have been
that the majority was right; and so what? No dissenting justice
questioned a state's power to punish the local possession or use of
marijuana if it chose, for one purpose or for any purpose. At least
as to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause,
no justice could have entertained that question. The proper
question was not whether marijuana's local possession and use is
punishable. The question was punishable by whom.
Both majority and minority opinions in Raich also left
untouched a specific, practical problem in reconciling a
jurisdictional element, like that in § 922(g), with the concept of
intrastate conduct that has a substantial effect on regulated
interstate commerce. Federal courts have viewed a gun's past trip
across a state line as sufficient connection to interstate commerce
to support federal intervention.
At the same time, and
inconsistently, they have appreciated that it is the current
intrastate conduct - the possession of the gun - that Congress
actually regulates, and that must have the substantial effect on
interstate commerce.
The temporal dissonance between a
completed past act and a current act leads to logical dissonance. If
it is the past trip across state lines that establishes federal
jurisdiction, then substantial effect ought not matter: the past
conduct was not intrastate in any event. By definition, it involved
a passage in interstate commerce.
So, if the past trip across state lines - the jurisdictional
nexus - is what matters for purposes of the Commerce Clause,
then felons with guns are not in Lopez's third category at all. The
felon-in-possession statute instead is a second-category regulation
of things in interstate commerce. But if that is so, then most
present possessions cannot be regulated conduct, for they are not
concerned with things in interstate commerce. Rather, they are
concerned with things that once were in interstate commerce, and
neither Lopez, Morrison, nor the Supreme Court's earlier decisions
support that retrospective extension of congressional power. The
Commerce Clause does not take Congress back to the future. If
§ 922(g) rightly should be understood as a second-category
regulation of things or people in interstate commerce, then only
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the felon who himself possesses a gun as he travels in interstate
commerce should fall within the statute's reach. The possessor of
a thing that only long ago was in interstate commerce should fall
outside the statute.
In sum, the minority in Raich forfeited a chance to improve
the clarity and predictability of the line that should separate
federal power from residual state and local power under the
Commerce Clause, or to address the disconnection between the
view that a past trip across a state line establishes federal
jurisdiction and the view that the current possession's substantial
effect on interstate commerce remains the overarching issue. The
forfeiture came in bypassing the issue of commerce, and its
extension of the economic. By making its stand instead on the
mushy ground of substantial relation, the minority was left only to
insist that the majority dishonored Lopez and Morrison, with the
majority insisting just as stoutly that it did not. On the present
terms of the debate, only the accretion of the next case, the one
after that, and so on, will reveal gradually who was right and who
wrong on the continued vitality of Lopez and Morrison.
Meanwhile, ending by circling back to the beginning, lower
courts and lawyers must reconcile Raich with Lopez and Morrison
when considering felons in possession of guns, if only because the
Raich Court insisted that the three cases continue to co-exist. In
simplest terms, then, the practical question is whether guns in a
felon's nightstand table are more like guns in a schoolchild's locker
and women attacked by men, or instead are more like marijuana
in a sick woman's nightstand. In several ways, the felon's gun is
more akin to the schoolchild's gun or to the assault than to the
marijuana.
First, Congress certainly did not undertake a broad, blanket
ban on guns as it did marijuana. To the contrary, guns in the
main are permissible; prohibited persons and guns are the
exception. And there are exceptions to the exceptions: even a
felon, for example, lawfully may possess an antique firearm under
federal law."' This spotty and specific regulatory scheme is
different than the "comprehensive framework" of the Controlled
Substances Act, as Raich painted it." 8
Second, the fact that guns are a durable consumer good, not a
perishable or consumable good like marijuana, also distinguishes
them from Raich's claim that "the activities regulated by the CSA
[Controlled Substances Act] are quintessentially economic... 9
Marijuana fell comfortably within Raich's definition of economic
of
and
consumption
("'the
production,
distribution,
117. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921(a)(3), (a)(16) (stating that guns manufactured
before 1898 are not "firearms" within the meaning of the act).
118. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2210.
119. Id. at 2211.
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at least because it must be consumed to be useful

and often because even the local possessor produces it. Not so for
the possession of a gun. The gun's value lies in large part in not
being consumed; in retaining its good working order and apparent
wholeness. Likewise, almost no individual possessors of a gun
have produced that gun. It is true that the gun probably passed in
commerce at least once (intrastate or often interstate), but that
may have been a very long time ago and without connection to
today's possessor." 1 The long-lasting, durable quality of guns,
though, means that they do not so clearly "have a significant
impact on both the supply and demand sides of the market"122 as
did marijuana in Raich.
Third, the only activity arguably outside Congress' reach
under the felon-in-possession statute really is just simple
possession. Justice O'Connor's observation remains true: "Lopez
makes clear that possession is not itself commercial activity. " 12 3 It
does, and if the Raich majority's acquiescence to Lopez and
Morrisoncan be taken as sincere, then that remains the rule.
Applying that simple possession rule to Raich is hard, but
perhaps not impossible. In Raich, today's mere possessor almost
surely is tomorrow's user or transferor, given the nature of
marijuana. That puts the marijuana possessor repeatedly close to
the market for the drug. Production also may draw on supplies
purchased in interstate markets and may do so repeatedly. The
gun possessor, by contrast, well may be a possessor only, forever.
He is a potential user, of course, but use of a gun does not follow
possession inevitably like the use of marijuana. The gun possessor
also is a potential transferor, but even the Raich majority
presumably would not suggest that Congress may regulate
everything potentially transferable locally.
D. Related Cases
At least twice in recent years, the Supreme Court also has
construed statutes narrowly to avoid Commerce Clause problems.
In 2001, the decision in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers24 produced the

120. Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 720 (3d ed. 1966)).
121. For opponents of federal regulation of simple possession of firearms, the
most directly troubling passage of Raich is the Court's approving comment
that, "[p]rohibiting the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of
commerce is a rational [and commonly utilized] means of regulating commerce
in that product." Id. The Court did not cite § 922(g) as an example, though.
Instead, it reached for exotica like eagles and nuclear material. See id. at
2211 n.36 (citing 16 U.S.C. §68(a)(2000) and 18 U.S.C. §831(a)(2000).
122. Id. at 2213.
123. Id. at 2225 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
124. 531 U.S. 159, 161 (2001).
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same 5-4 majority as Lopez and Morrison (again with Chief Justice
Rehnquist writing for the Court). Solid Waste Agency held that a
Corps of Engineers' regulation implementing a Clean Water Act
provision did not fairly interpret the Act and could not be
enforced. By striking the "Migratory Bird Rule" that way, Solid
Waste Agency avoided a Commerce Clause question.'25
Commenting on the significant constitutional question it
avoided, the Court wrote that "[plermitting respondents to claim
federal jurisdiction over ponds and mudflats falling within the
'Migratory Bird Rule' would result in a significant impingement of
the States' traditional and primary power over land and water
use."' 26 The Court read the statute to avoid those "significant
constitutional and federalism questions."127
Although Solid Waste Agency produced the familiar 5-4 split,
the Court's decision a year earlier to avoid a Commerce Clause
contest led to a unanimous opinion in Jones v. United States."'
There, the Court construed the federal arson statute 1 9 not to apply
to owner-occupied homes unused for commercial purposes.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg argued that Lopez
"reinforced" a narrow construction."3
Specifically, Jones concluded that an Oklahoma mortgage, a
Wisconsin insurance policy, and out-of-state natural gas did not
mean that an Indiana home was "used" in interstate commerce, as
"Were we to adopt the Government's
the statute required."'
expansive interpretation of § 844(i), hardly a building in the land
would fall outside the federal statute's domain," the Court
warned." 2 With an express concluding nod to Lopez, the Court
thought it "appropriate to avoid the constitutional question that
would arise were we to read § 844(i) to render the 'traditionally
petitioner Jones engaged 'a matter
local criminal conduct' in which
33
for federal enforcement.''
Justice Stevens concurred in Jones, with Justice Thomas
joining him. He noted the Court's "reluctance to 'believe Congress
intended to authorize federal intervention in local law enforcement
in a marginal case such as this.' 4
125. See id. at 162 (holding that the Clean Water Act does not extend to the
"abandoned sand and gravel pit" in Illinois that is a "habitat for migratory
birds").
126. Id. at 174.
127. Id.
128. 529 U.S. 848-49 (2000).
129. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i)(2000).
130. Jones, 529 U.S. at 851.
131. Id. at 854-57.
132. Id. at 857.
133. Id. at 858 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 350 (1971).
134. Id. at 859 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Altobella,
442 F.2d 310, 316 (7th Cir. 1971)).
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Then, in words that could apply as well to federal prosecution
initiatives targeting felons with guns, Justice Stevens wrote, "[t]he
fact that petitioner received a sentence of 35 years in prison when
the maximum penalty for the comparable state offense was only 10
years . . . illustrates how a criminal law like this may effectively
displace a policy choice made by the State."135 In closing, he
restated his "firm belief that we should interpret narrowly federal
criminal laws that overlap with state authority unless
congressional intention to assert its jurisdiction is plain." 36
The unanimous decision in Jones demonstrates that all
members of the Court share a measure of concern for the limits of
federal legislative authority to reach local crimes. Justice Stevens
had filed a dissenting opinion in Lopez, joined two dissents in
Morrison and wrote for the majority in Raich, but he expressed the
greatest concern about second-guessing state criminal justice
policy in Jones. He well might have that same concern in cases
involving prohibited persons with guns, where many states
provide a significantly lower prison term for felons in possession of
guns than the ten years 137 that federal law presently allows.'

135. Id.
136. Id. at 860.
137. Worse, federal law provides a 15-year minimum mandatory sentence,
with a maximum of life imprisonment, when the Armed Career Criminal Act
applies. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2000).
138. Other recent Tenth Amendment decisions also bear on the issue. In a
sense, those cases are the other side of the same jurisprudential coin. While
regulating interstate commerce is one of Congress's limited, enumerated
powers, the Tenth Amendment explicitly reserves to the states the powers not
extended to Congress by enumeration. That amendment makes explicit what
Article I, § 8 leaves implicit. See Sentelle, supra note 83, at 556 (stating "[alt
least twice in the five-year period next preceding Lopez, the Supreme Court
had given strong signal[sic] that the principle of the Tenth Amendment, and
therefore the concomitant doctrine of the limited power of the federal
government, was alive, if not alive and well"); See also Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) stating
[r]esidual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the
Constitution's conferral upon Congress of not all governmental powers,
but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, § 8, which implication was
rendered express by the Tenth Amendment's assertion that 'the powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the People'.
Not surprisingly, given the doctrinal relationship, the 5-4 split in the
Commerce Clause cases appeared again in Printz. See also New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 148 (1992) (resulting in a 6-3 split, with Justice
Souter also joining the majority). But the majority has held now for nine
years, and on occasion has grown.
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III. OPPOSITION To PREVAILING VIEW THAT §922(g)(1)
LIES WITHIN THE COMMERCE CLAUSE

To date, no federal court of appeals has found § 922(g)(1)
unconstitutional, facially or as applied. The appellate courts have
ruled the other way, and after Lopez at that.'39 However, since
1995 at least three federal appellate judges have authored
critiques of the prevailing conclusion that § 922(g)(1) (and, in
Judge Becker's case, the carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119) lies
within ambit of the Commerce Clause. A district judge also added
his voice in an Operation
Ceasefire case. Each of those opinions
40
merits consideration.
Judge Becker's opinion came first, in United States v.
Bishop.' His partial dissent addressed the carjacking statute, but

139. Every circuit except the District of Columbia has rejected the argument
that federal prosecution of local, non-commercial and simple possession of a
firearm exceeds the reach of the Commerce Clause. United States v. Cardoza,
129 F.3d 6, 10-11 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Santiago, 238 F.3d 213, 21617 (2d Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1046 (2001); United States v.
Singletary, 268 F.3d 196, 200-05 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 976
(2002); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996) (see also
United States v. Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 137-39 (4th Cir. 2001)); United
States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1150 (2002); United States v. Napier, 233 F.3d 394, 399-402 (6th Cir. 2000);
United States v. Stuckey, 255 F.3d 528, 529-30 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
534 U.S. 1011 (2001); United States v. Davis, 242 F.3d 1162, 1162-63 (9th Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 878 (2001); United States v. Dorris, 236
F.3d 582, 584-86 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 986 (2001); United
States v. Scott, 263 F.3d 1270, 1273-74 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S.
1166 (2002). These decisions generally rest on the "jurisdictional," or nexus,
element that § 922(g) includes. Or they cite the fact that a gun passed in
commerce at some earlier time. Recently though, a panel of the Ninth Circuit
held that Congress has no power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the
mere possession of homemade machine guns, under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o).
Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1142 (2-1 decision). Judge Alex Kozinski wrote the
majority opinion. Although Stewart also was convicted under § 922(g)(1) as a
felon in possession of guns, he challenged that conviction only on Second
Amendment grounds that the Court rejected quickly. Id. The government
eventually filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court
granted. It vacated summarily and remanded for reconsideration in light of
Raich. United States v. Stewart, 125 S.Ct. 2899 (2005). The case is pending
in the Ninth Circuit.
140. At least two other dissenting judges have argued that Lopez requires
sustaining Commerce Clause challenges to other federal statutes or
regulations less similar to § 922(g)(1). See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d
1444, 1454-85 (6th Cir. 1996) (Boggs, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part)(finding that 18 U.S.C. § 1955 does not regulate an instrumentality of
interstate commerce or a channel of interstate commerce, nor does it have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce); National Ass'n of Home Builders v.
Babbitt, 130 F.3d 1041, 1060-67 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)
(discussing why Endangered Species Act § 9(a)(1)(b) does not regulate
commerce, like the statute in Lopez does).
141. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 569 (3d Cir. 1995).
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an important segment concerned Scarborough. He argued
persuasively that Congress's real concern was violent crime, not
effect on interstate commerce, when it enacted federal penalties
for carjacking."'
A textual reference to interstate commerce
provided a handy jurisdictional link, Congress may have thought,
but it did not reflect the real cause of congressional action.
Judge Becker was sympathetic to the true motivation.
"Carjacking is a heinous offense violent and extremely
frightening," he acknowledged."
But he had systemic concerns.
Lopez worked a "sea change in the Supreme Court's approach" to
the Commerce Clause, in his view,'" and fidelity to that case
barred federal encroachment into state law enforcement even for
serious crimes.
"[Uinder the majority's broad definition of
commercial transaction," Judge Becker explained, "Congress could
constitutionally federalize all intrastate car-theft, all intrastate
crimes of theft, and perhaps nearly all criminal activity occurring
within a state." 145
To that list, Judge Becker added:
[flor instance, the majority's logic would permit a federal law
outlawing the theft of a Hershey kiss from a corner store in
Youngstown, Ohio by a neighborhood juvenile on the basis that the
candy once traveled in interstate commerce to the store from
Hershey, Pennsylvania. Similarly, the majority's broad reading
would vest Congress with power under the Commerce Clause to
enact a federal law requiring students in private schools to read
their homework assignments, so long as the government establishes
that the textbooks were published in another state. The majority's
reasoning destroys any "distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local."'"
Rhetorical excess?
Probably.
But the majority had no
principled answer and other judges have not.'
Judge Becker's
dissent noted that Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit
offers a definition of most common-law crimes as "'represent[ing] a
pure coercive transfer of wealth or utility from victim to
wrongdoer."'1" Abstractly or as a matter of economic theory, that
definition serves. But if the Commerce Clause reaches local
conduct that is "economic" or commercial only in Judge Posner's
very general sense, then it "includes within its scope a broad array
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 600-01 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Id. at 590.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 596.
See id. at 601-03 (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)

(discussing the majority's "substantial effects" arguments and why they run
afoul of the Lopez Court requirements).
148. Id. at 602 (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
217-18 (4th ed. 1992)).

2006]

Felons, Guns, and the Limits of FederalPower

of criminal activity, which "' [u]nder our federal system, the States
possess primary authority for defining and enforcing . . . . ,"" It
is unlikely that the Framers, trying at once to create a cohesive
union among thirteen small states still wobbly from war and to
allay deep suspicions that the states would lose their primary
sovereignty, intended future judges to interpret interstate
commerce at that high level of generality.
In the end, Judge Becker saw a carjacking statute that did
not regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce (for
example, cars traveling interstate), but rather regulated bad
things that criminals do locally to people in cars.50 The statute did
not demonstrably address activity that substantially affects
interstate commerce."' It also offered no jurisdictional element
limiting its reach to the three commercial areas of congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause." 2 That being so, "I believe
that non-commercial intrastate crimes, even ones receiving
publicity in the national media, are a matter of state and not
federal concern," Judge Becker summed up. His critique fits as
well a felon's local possession of a gun as it fits a carjacking.
Several months after Bishop, Judge Alice M. Batchelder filed
her opinion in United States v. Chesney." While she concurred in
the result, affirming a § 922(g)(1) conviction, her opinion made
clear that she concurred only because she thought the Sixth
Circuit was bound by its own recent decision.TM Judge Batchelder
disagreed strongly with her colleagues' view of the Commerce
Clause.
Her concurrence challenged directly the conventional notion
that a jurisdictional element relating to interstate commerce saves
§ 922(g). That jurisdictional element, which § 922(g) contains, is
the principal reason appellate courts have upheld the statute after
Lopez.
Judge Batchelder argued that a federal criminal statute must
satisfy one of two threshold questions to fit within Lopez's third
category of Congress's commerce power (regulating those activities
having substantial relation to interstate commerce). 155
She
explained:
A federal criminal statute must either (1) by its terms have
something to do with "commerce" or some sort of economic
enterprise, or (2) be an essential part of a larger regulation of
149. Id. (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561 n.3).

150. Id. at 597-600.
151. Id. at 600.
152. Id. at 594.
153. 86 F.3d 564, 574 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1282 (1997).
154. Id. (Batchelder, J., concurring)(believing the court bound by United
Stated v. Turner, 77 F. 3d 887, 889 (6th Cir. 1996)).

155. Id. at 575.
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economic activity "in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the intrastate activity were regulated." If either (1) or (2) is
satisfied, two additional inquiries must be made in order to
determine whether a statute falls within the third category of
activities Congress can regulate under its interstate commerce
power.'
Those two additional inquiries are whether the statute
contains a jurisdictional element and whether1 7 the regulated
6
activity substantially affects interstate commerce.
In short, Judge Batchelder urged that Lopez does not mean
that a federal criminal statute withstands scrutiny under the
Commerce Clause merely because it contains a jurisdictional
element. The jurisdictional element is an issue only if the statute
first concerns "commerce" or plays an essential part in a broader
economic regulatory scheme that would be at risk without some
control of intrastate activity. In other words, the jurisdictional
element is necessary if the statute meets one of the first two tests,
but it never is sufficient if the statute does not. '
However
capacious, the Commerce Clause still limits the federal
government's reach to commercial activity that spans more than
one state. Both terms in "interstate commerce" matter. 159 It is not
merely the Crossing State Lines Clause.
Judge Batchelder then discussed why § 922(g)(1) neither
concerns commercial activity (any more than possession of a gun
in a school zone did in Lopez) nor fills an essential role in broader
regulation of economic activity. 6 ' For the sake of argument, she
reasoned, shipping or receiving guns in interstate commerce might
concern broader regulation of economic activity, but banning mere
possession is not an essential part of such a scheme.'
That brought Judge Batchelder to her most powerful point,
again concerning the common belief that a jurisdictional element
salvages § 922(g):
[A] statute that regulates non-commercial activity cannot be
converted into a statute that regulates commercial activity by dint
of clever legislative craftwork. But in holding that the inclusion of a
jurisdictional element in § 922(g)(1) transforms that statute into
regulation of commercial activity, . . ., the majority reduces the
Lopez analysis to a single question: Does a challenged statute
contain a jurisdictional element? When the answer to this question
is "yes," according to the majority, both Lopez's "regulation of

156.
157.
158.
159.
issue.
160.
161.

Id. at 575-76 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 576 & 576 n.4.
See id. at 576 (discussing the findings of the Court in Lopez).
As does "foreign," of course, when that is the stripe of commerce at
"Interstate commerce" is short for both foreign and interstate here.
Id. at 578.

Id.
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commercial activities" test and its "jurisdictional element" test are
satisfied."6

Federal legislators cannot number alchemy among their
constitutional powers, in other words. Lopez did not permit
Congress "magically to produce a commercial activity (possession
of a firearm 'in or affecting commerce') out of a non-commercial
one (possession of a firearm) by conferring a jurisdictional
credential on the non-commercial activity."" Commerce may be
gold, but what is not commerce remains a baser metal not in the
congressional vault. A jurisdictional element will not turn noncommercial possession into commercial activity, or give Congress
power under the Commerce Clause it does not have.' Again, it is
not a Crossing State Lines Clause; it is a Commerce Clause,
concerning interstate and foreign economic intercourse.
Judge Harold DeMoss wrote his dissent later that summer in
United States v. Kuban.'
He looked closely at the textual
differences between the present felon-in-possession statute,
§ 922(g)(1), and former § 1202(a), which the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act of 1986 repealed.'"
Unlike § 1202(a), the current statute uses the term "in or
affecting commerce" to modify only the verb "possess."'67 Further,
Judge DeMoss observed, only the offense of receiving guns or

162. Id. at 579 (internal citations omitted). Although she did not address
directly the tension in relying solely on a jurisdictional element to approve a
statute, on the one hand, while addressing intrastate activity with a
substantial effect on interstate commerce on the other hand, Judge Batchelder
in fact reconciled the two by proposing the jurisdictional element as an
additional filter on congressional regulation of intrastate economic activity.
Other courts have treated it as the only filter, which again makes meaningless
a discussion of Lopez's third category because functionally it treats a statute
as in the second category.
163. Id. at 580.
164. Bishop, 66 F.3d at 593-96, (Becker, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Judge Batchelder also took the majority to task for treating the
Supreme Court's silence on a constitutional question as constitutional
approval. Chesney, 86 F.3d at 581 (Batchelder, J., concurring). She noted
correctly that the Supreme Court never has ruled on the constitutionality of
the former § 1202(a), let alone on the constitutionality of the current
§ 922(g)(1). Id. Incidentally, this is not the only time that Judge Batchelder
has shown a strong interest in the limits of congressional power under the
Commerce Clause. She authored the panel opinion in United States v. Faasse,
227 F.3d 660 (6th Cir. 2000), that struck down the Child Support Recovery Act
of 1992 as unconstitutionally applied there, and also wrote the dissent when
the en banc Sixth Circuit overruled the Faassepanel. United States v. Faasse,
265 F.3d 475, 494 (6th Cir. 2001) (en banc).
165. 94 F.3d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1996).
166. Id. at 976-79. Again, Scarborough and Bass concerned the former felon
in possession statute, § 1202(a).
167. Id. at 977 (DeMoss, J., dissenting in part).
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ammunition now uses the phrase "has been shipped or transported
in interstate or foreign commerce. " "
He reasoned next that Lopez means a felon's possession of a
gun "must now 'substantially affect interstate commerce. 1 69 "The
mere fact that a felon possesses a firearm which was transported
in interstate commerce years before the current possession," Judge
DeMoss continued, "cannot rationally be determined to have a
'substantial impact on interstate commerce' as of the time of
170
current possession."
Judge DeMoss then reached the constitutionality of
§ 922(g)(1) in Kuban "because the facts are so compellingly local in
nature."7' With local police officers, initial local custody, and state
charges at first, Kuban's case was entirely local.' 7' The statute, he

168. Id. Here the lineage of felon-in-possession statutes matters. The
Federal Firearms Act of 1938 made it unlawful for "any person who has been
convicted of a crime of violence or is a fugitive from justice to receive any
firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or
foreign commerce;" possession then was presumptive evidence of the
shipment, transportation, or receipt. 15 U.S.C. § 902(f) (1940) (repealed 1968).
The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90351, 82 Stat. 197, repealed the 1938 Act. Title VII of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 extended the prohibition to all felons (and
others, but not fugitives) "who receive[ ], possess[ ],or transport[ I in
commerce or affecting commerce" any firearm (but not ammunition). 18
U.S.C. app. § 1202(a)(1968). However, Title IV of the same Act made it
unlawful for felons, fugitives, and others both "to ship or transport any firearm
or ammunition in interstate or foreign commerce," 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1964 &
Supp. V 1970), or "to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been
shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce." 18 U.S.C. § 922(h).
See generally Bass 404 U.S. at 342-44 & nn. 9-10 (finding that the Gun Control
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213, amended both § 922 and
§ 1202(a), but not materially for present purposes, meaning Title IV of the
Omnibus Act was a modified version of the 1938 Act, while Title VII of the
Omnibus Act punished possession directly for the first time).
In 1986, Congress repealed § 1202(a) with the Firearms Owners'
Protection Act, Pub. L. 99-308, § 102(6)(D), 100 Stat. 449, 452.. The 1986 Act
also combined the old Title IV provisions, former § 922(g) and § 922(h), into
one subsection, § 922(g).
The current version then, is a melange of the old laws (setting aside the
new groups of prohibited persons added over time). In short, shipping and
transporting "in interstate or foreign commerce" is a crime; that rings of Title
IV. Possessing "in or affecting commerce" also is a crime; that rings of Title
VII in part. All of those acts (shipping, transporting, and possessing) are in
the present tense as they relate to commerce. Finally, receiving any firearm
or ammunition "which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign
commerce" is a crime; note the emphasis on the past tense as to the receipt
offense. Only this last receipt offense is a relic of the 1938 Act. Federal
Firearms Act, § 902(f).
169. Kuban, 94 F.3d 978.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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concluded, was unconstitutional as applied to Kuban.
The
government offered no proof that Kuban's possession of weapons
"had any effect whatsoever,
much less a substantial effect, on
17 3
interstate commerce."
Perhaps the most interesting insight in the Kuban dissent
was Judge DeMoss' observation that, "[i]f the government is
correct that all it takes to get a conviction under § 922(g)(1) is to
show that a felon possessed a firearm which at some time in past
history was shipped in interstate commerce, then all of the other
elements
of § 922(g)(1)
are
rendered
surplusage and
meaningless."'7 4 He was right as to receipt, and almost right as to
shipping or transporting. Every receipt of a gun made in another
state would be an illegal possession, under the government's
theory. The only shipping or transporting that would not be an
illegal possession as well would concern a felon who obtains a gun
manufactured in his own state before it crosses state lines, and
then ships it out of state.
This insight strengthened Judge DeMoss' argument that,
"Congress chose not to rely upon the 'minimal nexus' of
Scarborough, but rather crafted § 922(g) to have clear and
unambiguous connections with interstate commerce."'75 Perhaps
the judge was too polite in assessing Congress's attention to the
problem. But whatever Congress chose, the Commerce Clause
creates independent demands.
Many felon-in-possession
prosecutions today present no 'minimal nexus' to interstate
commerce, even collectively, absent a rhetorical revision of these
words that wholly wrests them from their common meanings.
Finally, a district court opinion, Judge Stewart Dalzell's in
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, warrants attention. That
district's anchor city, Philadelphia, was an Operation Ceasefire
locale. A convicted felon, Alfonzo Coward, faced indictment in
federal court after the Philadelphia Police Department stopped his
car and found a loaded 9mm gun under the passenger seat.' 76 A
jury convicted Coward of "knowingly possess[ing] in and affecting
interstate commerce, a loaded firearm . . . loaded with eighteen
rounds of ammunition," as the indictment charged.'77
Judge Dalzell sustained the conviction, but "in the
expectation of a reversal" he obviously hoped would follow. 17 He
173. Id. at 979.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 977.
176. United States v. Coward, 151 F. Supp.2d 544 (E.D. Pa. 2001), af/d, 296
F.3d 176 (3d Cir. 2002).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 555. The Third Circuit did not reverse; it upheld § 922(g)(1)
against Coward's Commerce Clause challenge. Coward, 296 F.3d at 183-84.
However, the Third Circuit also remanded the case on Coward's suppression
motion to permit the district court to determine discretionarily whether to
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upheld the § 922(g)(1) possession conviction even though, in his
view, Coward "committed no federal crime."179
The Coward district court argued that Lopez and Morrison
mean the end of the Scarborough"legal fiction" that a gun's earlier
trip through interstate or foreign commerce forever after links its
mere possession to commerce. Specifically, Judge Dalzell wrote:
Simply phrased, Scarborough'slegal fiction is that the transport of a
weapon in interstate commerce, however remote in the distant past,
gives its present intrastate possession sufficient interstate aspect to
fall within the ambit of the statute. This fiction is indelible and
lasts as long as the gun can shoot. Thus, a felon who has always
kept his father's World War II trophy Luger in his bedroom has the
weapon "in" commerce. The question now is whether this legal
fiction can survive as a statutory construct in the shadow of the
edifice the Supreme Court has built upon Lopez's foundation."
The district court in Coward concluded that this aspect of
Scarborough does not survive. Local possession of a gun, without
any factual suggestion of a "commercial or transactional context"
to the possession,' is not a federal offense, the Coward district
court reasoned.
Judge Dalzell decided, however, that acquitting Coward
would require overruling Scarborough and Third Circuit precedent
on § 922(g)(1).
In the federal judicial hierarchy, he could not do
1
that. 82
The Third Circuit could have overruled its own precedent on
Coward's appeal, but did not. In the last three decades, gun
prosecutions have proven a persistent illustration of the truth that
judges often value the familiar wrong answer over the unfamiliar
right one.'83 In practice, federal courts adhere as much to a

permit the government to reopen the suppression hearing, after holding that
the district court failed to require the government to prove reasonable
suspicion for the traffic stop. Id. at 184. Effectively, that left the district court
free to thwart the prosecution by suppressing all evidence of the crime. That
is exactly what the district court did on remand, after bemoaning the fact that
the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania "has
elected to make his office, and therefore this Court, an adjunct of state law
enforcement through Operation Ceasefire. Thus, far from presenting a
professional disability, the prosecutor's state court experience makes her
doubly qualified to represent the Government in its chosen role as an arm of
the local District Attorney." United States v. Coward, No. CRIM. 00-88, 2002
WL 31012793, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 2002) (unpublished opinion on remand).
179. Coward, 151 F. Supp. 2d at 554-55.
180. Id. at 549.
181. Id. at 554.

182. Id. at 554-55.
183. Regardless whether one approves or disapproves of the outcome, the
decision in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), is a striking
example of the judicial preference for stability over intellectual consistency
and even constitutional accuracy. That opinion, upholding Miranda v.
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doctrine of stabile decisis as to stare decisis.
IV.

GUN POSSESSION: A NATIONAL INTEREST, BUT NOT A
FEDERAL ONE

In the same way that Lester Lemons' and Alfonzo Coward's
unremarkable cases were local, most other federal prosecutions of
felons who possess guns are local, too. To be sure, in all corners of
the nation there is wide interest in firearm proliferation and gunrelated violence. It is a general policing interest. That so, this
national interest is decidedly not a federal interest. On the whole,
both Congress and the federal courts have seemed unconcerned
with the difference between national and federal when thinking
about use or possession of guns.
Oddly, the same federal actors (and federal prosecutors)
appear to give less thought to actual interstate and international
commerce in guns: manufacture, importation, exportation, and
large-scale distribution of firearms. There lies a legitimate federal
interest, all but ignored in the effort to address a national but nonfederal problem of post-market local possession of guns."
Congress and the Department of Justice largely abjure a
constitutionally sound policy of 'separating the gun from the man'
with a broad, commerce-based approach to the manufacture of,
and trade in, firearms. Instead, and in spite of the comparatively
trivial number of federal prosecutors, judges, and federal criminal
justice dollars, they continue to pursue a constitutionally
questionable policy of 'separating the man from his gun,' one
imprisoned man at a time.
Felon-in-possession prosecutions continue to flourish in and,
in some places, flood federal courts. Some judicial reconciliation of
these prosecutions with the limits of federal power would be a
modest step in preserving the resources and role of federal courts.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), and asserting Miranda's constitutional roots in
the face of a plausible argument that Congress attempted to overrule that
decision with 18 U.S.C. § 3501, was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Dickerson 530 U.S. at 431-44. Only Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented. Id.
at 444. Had he served on the Supreme Court in 1966, Chief Justice Rehnquist
likely would not have authored or joined Mirandain the first instance.
184. According to a May 2003 report of the Americans for Gun Safety
Foundation, 20 of the 22 major federal gun statutes were largely unused
during the three fiscal years ending September 30, 2002. AMERICANS FOR
GUN SAFETY FOUNDATION, THE ENFORCEMENT GAP: FEDERAL GUN LAWS
IGNORED 2-3 (2003). The report concludes that during this three-year period,
85% of federal gun prosecutions were for violations of just two statutes: illegal
possession of a firearm by a felon or other prohibited person (18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g)), and using or carrying a firearm during a violent or drug-related
crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c))). Id. at 34. The Americans for Gun Safety
Foundation presents itself as a centrist organization. It is a project of the
Tides Center, which promotes social change. Some see the Tides Center as
left-leaning.
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Practical reconciliation of the Commerce Clause's limits and the
felon-in-possession statute lies in avoiding the constitutional
question (and the statute's possible infirmity) by construing
§ 922(g)(1) to require that the government prove as a matter of
adjudicative fact that gun possessions were commercial or
economic activity, and as a matter of legislative fact that such
possessions in the aggregate have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce.
Five steps produce that reconciliation, without
dramatic change that would alarm courts savoring social and legal
stability.
A. Reconciliation in Five Steps
First, while § 922(g)
comes
clothed
in
presumed
constitutionality, Congress clad it in little more than that
presumption. The statute itself includes no congressional findings
of the impact of firearm possession by felons on interstate
commerce. It also addresses unmistakably local conduct, at least
under the possession prong of § 922(g).
So there are no
congressional findings that courts might hesitate to dispute.
Second, Bass concerned a different felon-in-possession
statute. Moreover, the jurisdictional element in the old § 1202(a)
was different than the wording in the current § 922(g). In the
current statute, the possession version of the crime explicitly
requires that the defendant possess the gun "in or affecting
commerce." That is present tense. Only the receipt version of the
crime uses the past tense to describe the acceptable link to
interstate shipment. Judge DeMoss made a powerful argument in
his Kuban dissent that this distinction suggests a congressional
purpose to draft a statute requiring "clear and unambiguous
connections with interstate commerce," at least as to simple
possession.""
At a minimum, Bass does not fairly establish the
constitutionality of this statute, which Bass never considered. It
offers scant enough support for the constitutionality of the old
statute. Even viewed charitably, thirty-five years later Bass fares
poorly against Lopez. In sum, no Supreme Court decision binds
federal courts to accept the constitutionality of a felon-inpossession prosecution under § 922(g).
Third, the jurisdictional element in § 922(g) does almost
nothing to winnow the field of gun possessions illegal under
federal law, let alone down to those with an "explicit" effect on
interstate commerce as Lopez contemplated."
Because most
states manufacture relatively few firearms, and the United States

185. Kuban, 94 F.3d at 977 (DeMoss, J., dissenting).
186. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562 (explaining that the statute has no express
jurisdictional element or connection with interstate commerce)..
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annually imports in the range of one million,"' practically every
felon holding a gun in many states falls within the statute's
jurisdictional element, as the government and federal courts
construe that element. With that construction, the federal statute
strangely begins to resemble varying state laws after all: it
reaches identical conduct (for example, a felon holding a Smith &
Wesson .38) differently in different states.
In states where
companies make guns, felons may possess those brands without
fear of § 922(g); in states where companies do not, felons face
greater restriction. With that lack of uniformity, one of the best
reasons for federal intervention fades.
Further, the simple act of possessing a gun usually does not
provide a link to interstate commerce. In Lopez, neither the
justices in the majority nor most of the dissenters looked to
possession of the gun as the connection to commerce. They looked
instead to the school zone, or more accurately, to the potential
effect on activity (education) occurring in the school.'" That was
the arguable link to commerce."'
With a felon merely possessing a gun anywhere, the statute
offers not even the possible linkage to interstate commerce that
the school zone suggested in Lopez. As presently understood,
§ 922(g)(1) requires only status as a felon - hardly commercial and the simple possession of a gun that once crossed a state line
for any reason. And because guns are durables (valuable in their
preservation, not in their consumption or destruction), unlike the
evanescent, consumable marijuana in Raich, mere possession of a
gun does not present the same constantly looming threat of an
impact on interstate commercial markets that marijuana does.
The marijuana user ever must be looking for more if she is to
continue use, and that fact raises at least the possibility that she
will venture into the interstate market.
187. See supra notes 97 and 98 (detailing statistics that show which states
make certain guns and the United States importation of guns).
188. The government also argued that the threat of violent crime carries
national economic effect, and therefore the necessary impact on interstate
commerce exists. But the Court rejected that contention quickly. Lopez, 514
U.S. at 563-64. That argument should be no more persuasive as to felons with
guns than it was in Lopez. Moreover, Morrison lay to rest the notion that
violent crime is a sufficient commercial link to support federal legislation.
Most violent crime simply is not economic behavior, by pragmatic or
practicable definition. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612-19. More abstractly or
theoretically, it may be. See note 148, supra (referring to the dissent in Bishop

in which Judge Posner's theory is explained).
189. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-66 (explaining the arguable link to
commerce); id. at 618-25 (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see id. at 602-03
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that gun "possession is the consequence,
either directly or indirectly, of commercial activity. In my judgment,
Congress's power to regulate commerce in firearms includes the power to
prohibit possession of guns at any location . .
").
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Fourth, the "minimal nexus" test that Bass presaged and that
Scarborough minted flowed from statutory construction, not from
consideration of constitutional limitations. Even assuming, safely,
that the Supreme Court meant implicitly that the nexus would not
fall below a constitutional floor, Scarborough made no effort to
determine where that floor lies. That is exactly what Lopez did,
albeit with a different § 922 subsection. 90
Fifth, whatever the statutory requirement of a "minimal"
linkage to interstate commerce meant in Scarborough, it cannot
trump the constitutional imperative in Lopez. For activities in the
third category of congressional competence under the Commerce
Clause, like § 922(g) if it fits anywhere, the aggregate effect on
interstate commerce must be "substantial" to satisfy the
Constitution.'
Moreover, "minimal" and "substantial" are relational terms,
empty of content without reference to something. One hundred
pounds indeed is a "minimal" amount of topsoil, but it also is a
locally noteworthy amount of cocaine and a globally urgent
amount of missing plutonium. The term is a rhetorical device that
requires context: topsoil or plutonium?
Here that context is the constitutional plan of federal power.
Both Lopez and Raich preserve the sensible rule of Perez v. United
States"' and earlier cases that courts measure effects on interstate
commerce in the aggregate." 3 What other than the aggregate
would Congress rightly consider in enacting legislation? It would
risk the evils of attainder if it focused on individual situations,
rather than on collective problems. It also would ensure defeat by
the criminal, any one of whom could point to the pettiness of his
spoils when considered in isolation.
But Lopez also requires that this aggregate effect be
"substantial.""4 Again, that is a relational term, but it places
proper emphasis on broad concerns that go to the harmonious
working of the union of states, rather than just on recurrent issues
affecting each of them singly."' In this sense, the "substantial"

190. And of course, Scarborough and Bass concerned a different statute. So
the different subsection of § 922 at issue in Lopez hardly provides justification
to distinguish that case while relying on the two earlier decisions.
191. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
192. 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
193. Perez, 402 U.S. at 151-54. The Court in Perez wrote of the "class of
activities" in affirming congressional power to punish loan sharking, even
though any one loan shark's undertakings may be local.
194. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
195. Consider Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) at 195:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to
those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but not to
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effect that Lopez demands not only is consistent with Perez's
aggregate approach, but a logical corollary to it.
If Scarborough and Lopez are to co-exist, then the interpretive
standard of a "minimal nexus" must require proof of a present
substantial effect on interstate commerce, in the aggregate. In
other words, Lopez gives meaning and content to Scarborough's
statutory test, if a court seeks to make the two cases compatible.
With that compatible reading, federal courts might follow the
path of Jones and Solid Waste Agency and construe § 922(g)(1) to
avoid a serious risk of constitutional infirmity. They could adopt a
saving construction that, consistent with Lopez and Morrison,
requires the prosecution to prove both that this gun possession
was commercial activity and that as a class, possessions like it
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Judge DeMoss'
dissent in Kuban provides a partial framework for that
reconciliation, by distinguishing the old § 1202(a) from the current
§ 922(g).
B. The Lopez Legacy
Lopez was not the fluke that many judges and academics
assume.
The progression of cases following, from Jones to
Morrison to Solid Waste Agency, proves otherwise. Even Raich,
which in the end upheld a federal effort where Lopez and Morrison
struck down such an effort, relied upon Lopez and used its
analytical framework. With its different majority, Raich instead
might have abandoned (or at least ignored) Lopez were the earlier
case a fluke. It did not.
Still, more than ten years after Lopez, the lower federal courts
resist as grittily as ever its arrival. The problem may lie partly in
the stark, even polar, contrast in perceptions of Lopez and
Morrison. Each common assessment is too extreme, even
overheated: those cases neither are 'constitutional freaks' nor
harbingers of 'sea change.'
More likely they instead are
adjustments in a long and meandering line of Commerce Clause
cases stretching back to Gibbons v. Ogden, not so rigid as decisions
immediately before Justice Roberts' 1937 switch, but not so loose
as several that followed shortly after 1937.
In the long view, the polar descriptions of Lopez and Morrison
must be wrong, for the history of the Commerce Clause is a history
of judicial adjustment by familiar process of reasoning by analogy
- a process that itself adjusts to changing social norms. 96 Raich
those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect

other states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the government.

196. Happily, the late Professor and Dean Edward H. Levi chose the
Commerce Clause to illustrate this broad point in his examination of
constitutional adjudication.

That discussion, like the whole slim book that
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is the latest example of this process, and a good one. Commerce
Clause jurisprudence reflects a history of incremental, if often
uncertain, realignment, not polar pronouncements. The common
reactions to Lopez and Morrison are not just historically
inaccurate, or improbable at best; they also needlessly scare off
federal judges who crave a moderated, practical stability in
federal-state relations much more than they seek philosophical
purity in federalism.
From that longer historical viewpoint, the judicial reluctance
to give Lopez and cases following their due, particularly in felonin-possession prosecutions, takes on added irony. Few courts
mention Tot today, and none on this point. 197 Yet there, at the very
moment when the Supreme Court afforded Congress its greatest
reach under the Commerce Clause, Tot readily accepted the
Justice Department's concession that the first federal statute
punishing felons with guns did not extend to receipt of firearms
that traveled in interstate commerce only at some prior time.1 9
Tot surely makes Lopez seem not so radical at all, but smoothly of
a piece with Commerce Clause jurisprudence over the last 65
years.
Practical considerations remain, and in the end likely will
control the development of the Supreme Court's view of the
Given their own
Commerce Clause, as they always have.
caseloads, federal courts might reconsider whether by an
expansive construction of § 922(g) they foster in state and local law
enforcement officials an indolent and short-sighted reliance on the
limited resources of those federal courts to solve common, local law
enforcement problems.' 9 Indulging such reliance, federal judges
contains it, remains a classic. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 41-72, 57-102 (U. Chicago Press 1949).
197. Lawyers and judges remember Tot for its discussion of presumptions on
elements of an offense. See, e.g., Pigee v. Israel, 670 F.2d 690, 695 n.10 (7th
Cir. 1982)(citing Tot in a footnote following a discussion of basic and elemental
facts).
198. Tot, 319 U.S. at 466.
199. Almost every state punishes at least some criminals who possess
firearms. Statutes vary, appropriately and just as one would expect with fifty
different states. ALA. CODE 1975 § 13A-11-72 (Supp. 1994)(limiting scope to
crimes of violence, drug addicts and habitual drunkards); ALASKA STAT. §
11.61.200 (LexisNexis 2004); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-3102 (Supp. 2005); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-73-103(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 2005); CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021
(West Supp. 2005); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-12-108 (2004); CONN. GEN. STAT.

ANN. § 53a-217 (West Supp. 2005); DEL. C. ANN. tit. 11, § 1448 (2001); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-4503 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (West Supp. 2006); GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-11-131 (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-7 (Supp. 2004); IDAHO
CODE § 18-3316 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/24-1.1 (West Supp.
2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-47-4-5 (LexisNexis 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 724.26 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. 21-4204 (Supp. 2004); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
527.040 (LexisNexis 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.1 (2004); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 393 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., [Criminal] § 5-622 (Supp.
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may write a check that the executive cannot cover and imply a line
of credit that the Supreme Court, with any eye to the real
limitations of the federal executive branch and the judiciary itself,
may conclude the legislature constitutionally cannot extend. The
truth is that widely scattered federal courts, with a comparatively
light sprinkling of judges, never have been an effective forum in
which to address frequently recurring, pedestrian, local
malefactions even when those suggest a national phenomenon.
For good reasons, the Constitution does not assign federal courts
that task.
A decision now more than sixty years old, Tot, should
reassure federal courts in a reconciling adjustment in course. The
Commerce Clause can remain limited to true interstate and
foreign commerce, or at least to intrastate economic activities
greatly affecting actual interstate commerce, even when felons
have guns. That provision need not devolve permanently into a
fanciful Crossing State Lines Clause. For now it has.

2005); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 129B (2005) (requiring persons to obtain
license before possessing firearm, and does not allow persons who were
convicted of felony within five years of application to receive license); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.224f (2004); MINN. STAT. § 624.713 (Supp. 2004); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-37-5 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (2003) (prohibiting
possession of concealable firearms); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-313 (2005); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 28-1206 (2003); NEV. REV. STAT. § 202.360 (2003); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-5 (West 2004) (all persons
without permit prohibited from possessing firearms, and felons cannot get
permit); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-7-16 (LexisNexis 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 265.01(4) (McKinney 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1 (2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 62.1-02-01 (Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.13 (LexisNexis
Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1283 (Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 166.270 (Supp. 2005); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6105 (West Supp. 2005);
R.I. GEN. LAWS 1956 § 11-47-5 (2002) (crime of violence); S.C. CODE ANN. 1976
§ 16-23-30 (Law. Co.-Op. 2002); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-14-15 (2004); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-17-1307 (2003); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 46.04 (Vernon Supp.
2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503 (Supp. 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2
(LexisNexis 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (Supp. 2005); W. VA. CODE §
61-7-7; Wis. Stat. § 941.29 (2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (2005). Vermont
punishes the commission of a felony while carrying a firearm, VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 4005 (1998), but apparently not a felon's mere possession of a
firearm.

